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Abstract
Discrimination practices against women within the labour market are widely com-
mon and a matter of great concern for academics, policymakers and the society at
large. Focusing on wage discrimination practices, this study aims at understand-
ing the role that demand factors play in explaining the wage discrimination gap in
Portugal. Using a rich matched employer-employee data set  Quadros de Pessoal
 we explore cross-regional variations to identify the role of labour demand on the
gender wage gap.
Estimating a mincerian wage equation that accounts for worker, ﬁrm and job
characteristics, the empirical estimates revealed a total hourly wage discrimination
gap of -13.6 log points in mainland, varying from -0.4 to -24.4 log points across
Portuguese counties. This reinforces the existence of a territorial heterogeneity in
wage discrimination practices that enables us to use county variations to identify
the impact of local labour market forces on the wage discrimination gap.
Regarding the demand side factors, the regression results at the county level
showed that municipalities with a higher share of workers in the secondary sec-
tor exhibit a larger discrimination gap. Contrarily, counties with a higher share
of workers employed in micro establishments and with a higher share of minimum
wage earners exhibit a smaller discrimination gap. On the labour supply side, the
results revealed a positive impact of the youth activity rate (from 25 to 34 years
old) on the discrimination gap, i.e., employers in counties with a higher supply of
workers aged 25-34 seem to have more room to discriminate against women. Fi-
II
nally, concerning the state of the local labour market, the estimates indicate that
counties with high unemployment rates face low discrimination gaps, ceteris paribus.
Keywords: gender, wage discrimination, heterogeneity, territory
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"In considering research on gender diﬀerences in psychological attributes or non-
cognitive skills, some cautions must be borne in mind. First, even if men and women
do diﬀer on average, it is not possible at this point to know the role of nature versus
nurture."
Blau and Kahn (2016)
IV
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Gender discrimination involves a vast list of topics in the most varied areas, from
nursery education to labour market or health care access. Nowadays, the topic is
broadly discussed and a matter of great concern for policymakers and society at
large. In Portugal, measures such as criminalising street harassment and imposing
gender balance on corporate boards show a growing consciousness on the issue.
Despite this, gender equality is far from reality.
In the labour market, gender discrimination can take many shapes: the diﬃcult
access of women to management and top management positions, known as the glass
ceiling eﬀect (Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005; Cannings and Montmarquette, 1991),
the concentration of women in less paid industries, establishments or occupations
(Groshen, 1991) or simply a lower wage for an identical job position (Petersen and
Morgan, 1995; Heyman et al., 2013; Manning, 2003). In this dissertation, we will
focus on the latter topic.
An extensive empirical literature provides important evidence on the existence
of a wage gap between men and women, even after taking into account diﬀerences
in individual's, ﬁrm and job title characteristics (e.g., Cardoso et al. (2016)). In
the present study, we will provide empirical evidence in order to understand if dis-
crimination is homogeneous at the county level in Portugal. If not, we will try to
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identify the local factors that can explain this heterogeneity. Do the characteris-
tics of the supply or demand of labour impact on gender wage discrimination in a
certain municipality? Do social traits of the population inﬂuence the discrimina-
tory behaviour? These are the questions to be responded within the scope of this
dissertation.
We will start by estimating the discrimination gap  the part of the total gender
pay gap that remains unexplained when worker's, ﬁrm and job title characteristics
are taken into account  at the county level, by using a linear regression model,
to understand if there are relevant diﬀerences across the Portuguese territory. Fur-
thermore, we will investigate local determinants of the gender wage discrimination
gap by estimating one linear regression and controlling the impacts of these local
determinants on the local discrimination gap. Regions in Portugal are quite hetero-
geneous from many perspectives and the study of the association between gender
wage discrimination and characteristics of the local labour market as well as social
traits of the population is a very interesting yet quite unexplored topic.
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we review previous liter-
ature on gender wage discrimination. In Chapter 3, we estimate the discrimination
gap at the county level and, in Chapter 4, we study the impacts of local determinants
on the discrimination gap. Chapter 5 concludes.
2
Chapter 2
Gender discrimination
2.1 Theoretical explanations on gender discrimina-
tion
Economic discrimination occurs when an individual or a group of individuals is
diﬀerentiated based on economic factors, such as income, job availability and the
price or availability of goods and services. In this context, the concept of economic
discrimination can be related to wage gaps among workers. In practical terms, it
can refer to pay gaps between equally productive individuals, usually related to
their association to speciﬁc groups of the population according to gender, race,
religion, etc. (Cain, 1986). It is then important to distinguish if discrimination is
due to a group membership, such as gender, race or religion, or speciﬁcally towards
an individual (within-group discrimination), with no regard for such membership
characteristics (Aigner and Cain, 1977).
Economic discrimination against workers can be originated on the worker
side or on the employer side. The former occurs when workers discriminate a mi-
nority by demanding higher wages to accept working together, which leads to the
segregation of work forces. On the employer side, two situations may occur. Firstly,
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the assumption that any employer has the same prejudice against a minority low-
ers the supply and inherent wages for that minority workers. Secondly, assuming
employers' taste for prejudice can diﬀer, some may constantly under evaluate a
group's average abilities, also resulting in lower wages (Aigner and Cain, 1977).
One possible cause of this labour market discrimination is a pre-market discrimi-
nation, which leads to lower skills of certain minorities that will ultimately lead to
wage discrimination. Altonji and Blank (1999) claim the existence of pre-market
discrimination towards women related to low family expectations concerning future
work and impacting educational choices and opportunities. The authors add that,
in this context, women foresee the diﬃculties they would face if wanting to pursue
a man's job and would invest less energy to attain the skill set necessary for that
job, creating some sort of a snow-ball eﬀect.
There are several theories on how discrimination against women emerged.
Trentham and Larwood (1998) argue that part of the gender discrimination, the con-
centration of women in low-paying jobs, is due to individual preferences and speciﬁci-
ties that occur because of diﬀerent education and training, gender-role socialization,
stereotypes and personal values and prejudices. Szwajkowski and Larwood (1991)
attribute to the ﬁelds of human capital, economics, psychology and sociology a joint
responsibility on explaining gender discrimination, from wage gap regression studies
to sex role socialization studies. Diﬀerent authors point to the main causes of gender
discrimination emphasizing aspects such as psychological traits and non-cognitive
skills opposing women to men, e.g. as women being less capable of negotiating or
more risk averse. However, as interestingly discussed by Blau and Kahn (2016), even
if such diﬀerences currently exist, it is not possible to distinguish nature from nur-
ture, given the sociological and cultural context in which women have been involved.
Since the 1950s, following the Second World War, awareness and sensitiveness for the
discrimination topic rose widely and many non-discrimination principles, including
some regarding gender, emerged (Besson, 2008).
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From the 1970s to the 1990s, due to the development of new technologies and
inherent less importance of physical strength, the United States experienced a great
increase in the returns to skills, leading to a signiﬁcant reduction in the wage gap
(Borghans et al. (2016)). Bacolod and Blum (2010) add the increasing demand for
social skills as a cause of the gap narrowing. Also, the growing competitiveness
of ﬁrms in response to globalization helped reducing the gap (Black and Brainerd
(2004)). Blau and Kahn (2016) corroborate the long term decreasing trend, pro-
viding empirical evidence from 1980 to 2010, adding that occupations and industry
are still an important cause of gender wage diﬀerences and concluding that the
discrimination gap decreased much more slowly at the top of the wage distribution.
Gender discrimination can be analysed from many diﬀerent perspectives.
Many authors attribute a great part of the gender wage gap to the gender composi-
tion along the job and occupations ladder. Treiman and Hartmann (1981) argue that
women are paid less because they are more likely to be employed in low paid jobs,
such as clerical and services. This ﬁrst concept is called evaluative discrimination,
one of the most important causes of the gender wage gap. Groshen (1991) analysed
the gender wage gap in the US, from 1974 to 1983, and concluded that occupation
explained the most signiﬁcant part of the diﬀerence, from one third in manufacturing
to two thirds in services. Many other authors, such as Press (1986), argue that sex
segregation is the main cause of the gender wage gap. Jabbar et al. (2016) discussed
the teaching example to ilustrate that sex segregation matter, detailing the process
of feminization in the mid-1800s when men started leaving the activity to pursue
more promising opportunities. The within-job or taste-based discrimination occurs
when an individual earns a diﬀerent wage than an equal, and is found to be less im-
portant by several authors (Petersen and Morgan, 1995; Groshen, 1991). It is also
the type of discrimination that tends to disappear in the long run as it represents an
ineﬃcient allocation of resources: it means disregarding valid and skilled women just
because of their gender. Also, ﬁrms from competitive sectors have a much higher
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pressure towards eﬃciency and are theoretically the least discriminant (Heyman
et al., 2013). Opposingly, other authors argue that every market is imperfect and
therefore discrimination can prevail indeﬁnitely (Manning, 2003). This is the type
of discrimination that we will study. Thirdly, the allocative discrimination concerns
the limitations that female workers face in the access to well-paid or even top man-
agement positions. This phenomenon is called the glass-ceiling eﬀect, as if a sort
of transparent barrier was depriving women of reaching higher positions or higher
pay checks. The main diﬀerence between the allocative and the evaluative forms
of discrimination is that the ﬁrst regards a vertical segregation of gender while the
latter points to an horizontal concentration of women across less rewarding activity
sectors or ﬁrms. Cardoso et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that corroborates
the presence of a glass-ceiling eﬀect in the Portuguese case. The authors found a
signiﬁcant widening of the gender gap when comparing the 10th percentile to the
median and to the 90th percentile.
Another theory, suggested by Huertas et al. (2016), separates discrimination into
horizontal and vertical segregation: the horizontal being related to the evaluative
discrimination and the vertical to the allocative. Furthermore, they add to this
context the concept of sticky-ﬂoors, with respect to unfair promotions and wage
adjustment practices, as if female workers kept metaphorically stepping on some
sort of slimy pavement sticking their feet down. Similarly, the glass-ceiling eﬀect
is again mentioned by these authors, embracing the same stigma although relating
more speciﬁcally to top management job positions being hardly accessible to women.
2.2 Measuring the gender wage discrimination
In Europe, since the 1990s, female workers steadily became more present in the
labour market. Cipollone et al. (2012) studied the female labour force participation
from 1990 to 2008 and observed, for many European countries, an increase from 55%
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to 66%, accompanied by an increase of the female employment rate from 49% to
61%, although still with a relevant portion of temporary or part-time employment.
However, the gender pay gap is still a reality throughout Europe. According to
the most recent Eurostat studies from 2015, unconditionally, a woman earns on
average less 16,3% than a men, ranging from 5,5% in Italy and Luxembourg to
26,9% in Estonia. In this indicator, Portugal scores a 17,8% unadjusted pay gap,
with a growing trend since 2006. However, further analysis is needed in order to
understand what portion of this gap can be attributed to discrimination.
There is a large number of studies on wage discrimination in the Portuguese
labour market in the past decades. González et al. (2008) analysed and decom-
posed the gender pay gap, i.e., the total average diﬀerence of men and women's
wages, in Portugal, between 1985 and 2005, and concluded that discrimination is
the major contributor to the gap. In 2005, the total gap was 22 log points, slightly
lower than 1985's gap of 24 points. Of these totals, 67% and 52%, respectively,
were due to discrimination practices. Moreover, the authors conclude that industry
accounts for 80% to 98%, respectively in 1985 and 2005, of the endowments part
of the gap (the remaining part besides discrimination), being responsible for the
widening of the gap. Human capital variables contributed to the gap's reduction in
2005, in opposition to previous years.
Cardoso et al. (2016) analysed mainland Portugal from 1996 to 2008 and observed
a raw gender wage gap of 24 log points throughout the period. When controlling
for the employees' age, it lowers to a conditional gap of 23 log points. 19% of
this gap is attributed to the high allocation of women to ﬁrms of lower average
quality and other 19% to job characteristics. Almost two thirds of the total gap
remain unexplained and can be attributed to gender discrimination. According to
the same study, over the past twelve years, the raw gap decreased, mostly due to a
convergence in workers' characteristics and ﬁrm allocation, and the discrimination
component also decreased. However, women's access to well paid jobs worsens over
7
time and would have, by itself, contributed to widening the gender pay gap.
Vieira et al. (2003) add an interesting point of view on gender discrimination
through the analysis of the proportion of females in an establishment and its relation
to females' wages. The authors concluded that the concentration of women accounts
for 11% (in 1985) to 25% (in 1989) of the gender pay gap and that a higher relative
presence of women has a negative impact on women's wages and a positive impact on
men's wages. Hultin and Szulkin (1999), using data from Sweden, studied the impact
on the employees' wages of a gender-diﬀerentiated composition in the management
structure. Contrarily to Portugal, the results show that a strong female power
structure impacts positively on women's wages while a strong male composition
impacts them negatively. Male employees' wages are not aﬀected by any scenario.
As an alternative to OLS methods, authors such as Figueiredo and Botelho
(2013) and Mendes (2010) used quantile regressions and conclude that gender wage
diﬀerences grow along the wage distribution, meaning that higher levels of income
present higher gender gaps. The authors claim that OLS overestimates the gap for
lower quantiles and underestimates diﬀerences for upper quantiles.
There is a large number of studies regarding gender discrimination and the gender
pay gap across countries and over time. For an insightful empirical literature review,
see, e.g., Gupta et al. (2006); Cipollone et al. (2012); Cochard et al. (2015). However,
the research on within-country territorial dimension is very scarce.
Hirsch et al. (2013) argue that more populated labour markets will present less
discrimination traits since competition is higher and there is less room for such
ineﬃciencies. It was found that, for Western Germany, from 1975 to 2004, young
workers have much lower unemployment rates in large metropolitan locations than
in rural, a persistent diﬀerence of approximately 10 percentage points over 30 years
under analysis.
Huertas et al. (2016) studied the diﬀerences in the gender pay gap for Spanish
regions for the years of 2002, 2006 and 2010. The authors found signiﬁcant re-
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gional diﬀerences, with the raw gap ranging from 2 log points in Extremadura (2002
and 2006) to a maximum of 31.5 log points in Asturias (2010). This gap becomes
smaller after controlling for relevant variables although still presenting a relevant
heterogeneity among the twelve regions. To understand what may be causing these
diﬀerences, two groups of variables are tested: demographic variables, such as the
fertility rate and the age gap of ﬁrst marriage and variables related to the regional
labour market, such as the unemployment rate, minimum wage, the role of unions,
and, lastly, the share of regional public employment. The fertility rate has, as ex-
pected, a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the discrimination gap, which can be
related to women's larger distance to the labour market over motherhood. The
age gap at ﬁrst marriage also has a positive impact on the wage gap, according to
the authors, because of a more pronounced division of labour in couples where the
husband is older than the wife. Nevertheless, the estimation shows otherwise, what
can be explained by the presence of a high average marriage age in Spain. One
possible explanation presented is that marriage is usually linked to an economic
stability of both individuals and, therefore, regions with a higher marriage age gap
may have better labour conditions to women, sooner achieving the desired stability.
The remaining variables present the expected results: higher unemployment rates
are related to smaller gender gaps because of a higher pressure over wages; higher
minimum wages also beneﬁt women's position, since they are more present at the
bottom of the wage distribution; stronger unions and high public employment favour
equality amongst workers, impacting positively on equalising women's wages.
Pereira and Galego (2011) added a regional comparison of wages among Por-
tuguese regions, at NUTS II level, between each speciﬁc region and Lisbon. The
raw gaps are all negative because of Lisbon's higher presence of large companies
and stronger industrial structure and higher levels of education and qualiﬁcation.
In 1995, the gaps for men varied between 21% to 33%, when comparing Lisbon to
Algarve or to Norte, and between 20% and 35% for women, for the same regions.
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The situation is similar in 2002. Decomposition techniques are applied to the raw
data and the authors conclude that the behavior among regions is very similar for
both men and women. By controlling the regional endowments  education, tenure,
occupation, industry, and ﬁrm size , the authors conclude that a major part of
the gap vanished but not all of it. For men, in 2002, 40% to 100% of the gap (from
region Norte to Algarve) is explained by these variables. For women, more than 50%
of every region's gap is explained but not all of it. The explained part is due to the
occupation structure between Lisbon and other regions, with the former including
larger ﬁrms characterised by higher wages, and higher levels of education. Further
analysis, from 1995 to 2002, proved that the endowments gap between Lisbon and
other regions is growing, enforcing regional divergence. The authors attribute the
unexplained part of the gap to a temporary disequilibrium situation, to external
economies eﬀect or to a sorting eﬀect, i.e., an easier and more productive match
between employee and employer as a consequence of a denser urban agglomeration.
Discrimination in the labour market against women is a well-documented phe-
nomenon, studied across all continents and from many diﬀerent points of view. In
the present study, we will update the estimates of the total gender pay gap and
the discrimination gap in Portugal. Furthermore, as studied by some of the authors
mentioned, we will perform an exploratory analysis with the aim of identifying the
link between the local discrimination gap, at the county level, and the local labour
market conditions and other characteristics.
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Chapter 3
Territorial heterogeneity in wage
discrimination
3.1 Measuring wage discrimination at the county
level
3.1.1 The data
In order to understand heterogeneity across Portuguese municipalities, we will use
matched employer-employee data that covers all privately held companies in the
country  Quadros de Pessoal (QP). QP is a database collected by the Ministry
of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security that contains information, from 1985 to
2012, on three diﬀerent levels: ﬁrms, establishments and workers. In 2012, the data
includes information on around 2.3 million workers among 317 thousand establish-
ments across 278 municipalities in mainland Portugal. Information at the ﬁrm/
establishment level includes location, size, industry, number of employees, owner-
ship type, sales, etc.. Information at the worker level includes wage, tenure, type
of contract, education, qualiﬁcations, number of working hours, date of last promo-
11
tion, etc.. This is a mandatory survey for establishments with at least one wage
earner in the private sector, which is why it is a representative and reliable source
of information to estimate the gender wage discrimination gap at the county level.
We will use data at the worker level from 2012, the most recent year available.
3.1.2 The empirical model
Using a linear regression analysis, that allows us to model the relationship of a
dependent variable with a set of explanatory variables, we will estimate the raw
gender pay gap at the county level. The model writes as:
lnWi = α + δfemalei + εi (3.1)
where lnW is the natural logarithm of hourly wages (base wage plus regular bene-
ﬁts) for each worker i, α is a constant term, female is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for female workers and 0 if otherwise, and ε the random error term. δ is
the parameter of interest and measures the unconditional wage diﬀerence between
men and women. A negative coeﬃcient of the variable female, δ, indicates that,
in a speciﬁc county, female workers earn on average lower wages than men. This
regression was estimated 278 times using Stata (Data Analysis and Statistical Soft-
ware), one for each of the Portuguese municipalities, with information for 2.262.257
workers, varying from 214 workers in Barrancos to 308.636 in Lisbon (see Table A.3
in Appendix A for more detailed information). Azores and Madeira were excluded
because of a small representation of the data collected.
To estimate the wage discrimination gap, a standard mincerian wage equation
(Mincer, 1974), a wage regression with controls for worker, establishment and job
characteristics, is estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). OLS
estimates a set of unknown parameters, one for each of the explanatory variables,
that minimizes the total sum of square residuals. The model can be written as
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follows:
lnWi = α + δfemalei +Xiβ + εi (3.2)
where lnWi is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage of each worker i, α is a
constant term, female is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for female workers
and 0 if otherwise and δ is our parameter of interest, X is a vector of explanatory
variables for each individual i, β represents the vector of unknown parameters to be
estimated and ε an unobserved error term (zero mean and constant variance). X
includes a set of worker's, job title and establishment characteristics. The worker
dimension includes the following variables: a dummy for gender, linear and quadratic
terms in age, a dummy for foreigners and a set of dummies for education. The job
title controls include: dummies for qualiﬁcation at the 1-digit level, according to the
National Qualiﬁcation Framework; linear and quadratic terms in tenure; dummies
for occupation at the 1-digit level, according to the Portuguese Classiﬁcation of
Occupations (1-digit level); and dummies for type of contract (part-time or full-
time, ﬁxed-term or permanent). Finally, at the ﬁrm level, we will include size, as
the natural logarithm of the number of employees, and dummies for industry at the
1-digit level, according to the Statistical Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities. A
detailed description of all variables is present in Table A.1 Appendix A.
Thus, equation 3.2 extends equation 3.1 by adding an extensive set of controls
for worker, establishment and job characteristics in order to properly identify the
wage discrimination gap measured by the δ coeﬃcient. Equation 3.2 was also esti-
mated 278 times using Stata, for each county in turn, with information for a total
of 2.262.257 workers of mainland Portugal. A negative coeﬃcient of the variable
female, δ, indicates the existence of wage discrimination towards women.
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3.2 Empirical results
Portugal presents a global unconditional wage diﬀerence between male and female
workers of 14% and a discrimination gap of 13%1. These estimates were obtained
from the estimation of equations 3.1 and 3.2 by OLS, respectively, using a total
sample of 2.3 million wage earners aged 16-65 among the 278 counties. This means
that only 8% of the total wage gap is attributable to workers, establishment or
job title characteristics. The full results of equation 3.2 for the aggregated data of
mainland Portugal are presented in Table A.2 of Appendix A. The estimates at the
county level for the raw gap and for the discrimination gap, as well as the number
of workers considered in each municipality, are listed in Table A.3 in Appendix A.
Some municipalities present coeﬃcients that are not statistically signiﬁcant at a
10% signiﬁcance level. This is the case of 11 municipalities in the discrimination
model (3.2) and, for the robustness of the results, they will be excluded from the
remaining analyses (namely Alfândega da Fé, Terras de Bouro, Sardoal, Arronches,
Vila do Bispo, Vieira do Minho, Mourão, Monchique, Torre de Moncorvo, Figueiró
dos Vinhos and Mértola).
By looking at the results at the county level, we can state that there is het-
erogeneity across the Portuguese territory, as it may be observed in Figure 3.1.
The discrimination wage gap varies from approximately -2.4% in Caminha to -
24% in Sever do Vouga or -23% in Mangualde, with a standard deviation of 4.4
log points. Moreover, when we look at Figures 3.2 and 3.3, we can not only con-
ﬁrm the territorial dispersion of the pay gap but also a diﬀerent pattern when
we consider the raw pay gap or the discrimination factor. The two maps show
that the west coast and the central area of the country present higher pay gaps,
gathering the majority of municipalities with values over the 4th quintile. The cen-
tral west region of Portugal present high values of discrimination, which can, at a
1The exact wage diﬀerence is computed as exponential(δ)− 1
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Figure 3.1: Box plot of
the distribution of the
gender wage discrimina-
tion gap across counties
in Portugal, 2012
ﬁrst glance, mislead us to think that discrimination
is directly proportional to population density, since
this area is one of the most populated in the country.
However, it is important to notice that Lisbon and
Porto metropolitan areas do not present the highest
levels of discrimination. Additionally, the analysis of
the presented maps shows us that some municipalities
that have very high raw pay gaps between men and
women have, contrarily, low discrimination gaps, e.g.
Castro Verde (estimates of -0.46 vs -0.13) or Entron-
camento (-0.33 vs -0.11). Also, counties with low raw
pay gaps can face very high discrimination gaps, such
as Baião (-0.05 vs -0.13) or Arruda dos Vinhos (-0.07
vs -0.15). However, these are very small municipal-
ities, all of them with a number of inhabitants and
workers below average and only Baião slightly above
the median. The standard deviation of the pay gaps are relatively low  7.2 log
points for the raw gap and 4.4 for the discrimination gap. Nevertheless, both in-
dicators present negative skewness values, which means there is a concentration of
municipalities in higher values of the distribution and therefore of discrimination
(Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Wage regressions at the worker level: descriptive statistics of
the raw pay gap and the gender wage discrimination gap
Variable name N Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness
Raw pay gap 278 -0.462 0.059 -0.134 -0.132 0.072 -0.625
Discrimination gap 278 -0.244 -0.005 -0.115 -0.111 0.044 -0.258
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Figure 3.2: Raw gender wage gap
in Portugal, 2012
Figure 3.3: Gender discrimina-
tion wage gap in Portugal, 2012
1In Figure 3.2, 17 counties are not signiﬁcant at a 10% signiﬁcance level: Mourão, Vila Nova de
Paiva, Resende, Murtosa, Barrancos, Mondim de Basto, Ourique, Manteigas, Sabugal, Castanheira
de Pera, Santa Marta de Penaguião, Arronches, Crato, Alvito, Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo, Murça
and Caminha. In Figure 3.3, 11 counties are not signiﬁcant at a 10% signiﬁcance level: Alfândega
da Fé, Terras de Bouro, Sardoal, Arronches, Vila do Bispo, Vieira do Minho, Mourão, Monchique,
Torre de Moncorvo, Figueiró dos Vinhos and Mértola.
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Chapter 4
Local determinants of the wage
discrimination gap
4.1 The empirical model
In the previous section, the results showed that the discrimination wage gap varies
widely among Portuguese counties. In this section, we present an exploratory anal-
ysis in order to shed some light on the local factors that may impact on the dis-
criminatory practices at the employer level. The focus on county variations has the
advantage of assuring a common institutional support, which allows us to concen-
trate on the role of market forces (Carneiro and Varejão, 2012).
Three groups of variables will be considered in our analysis: characteristics of
the demand for labour, characteristics of the supply of labour and more exploratory
group of local determinants, including cultural and social traits of the local popu-
lation. In particular, we will include the following factors at the county level, all
measured in 2011, except for the abstention rate in local elections (2009) and the
right or left-wing political majority (2005 and 2009):
1. Characteristics of the demand for labour:
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(a) Share of minimum wage earners, measured by the number of workers
earning minimum wage as a percentage of the total number of workers;
(b) Share of workers per economic sector, measured by the number of peo-
ple working in primary, secondary or tertiary sector establishments as a
percentage of the total number of workers;
(c) Share of workers per establishment size, measured by the number of peo-
ple working in establishments with less than 10 workers, 10 to 49 work-
ers, 50 to 249 workers and with 250 workers or higher  micro, small,
medium, and large establishments, respectively  as a percentage of the
total number of workers;
(d) Female employers share, measured by the number of women among all
employers of privately-held establishments;
(e) Share of young employers, measured by the number of employers aged 15
to 34 years old among all employers of privately-held establishments.
2. Characteristics of the supply of labour:
(a) Young workers activity rate, measured by the supply of labour (employed
and unemployed) of the local population aged 15 to 24 years old and 25
to 34 years old among the total resident population of the correspondant
age group;
(b) Share of female workers, measured by the number of women employed
over the total number of employees in private establishments;
(c) Share of workers holding a college degree, measured by the graduates in
higher education among the total employees in private establishments;
(d) Share of female immigrants, measured by the number of foreign resident
women as a percentage of the total resident female population.
3. Other local determinants:
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(a) Other characteristics of the local labour market:
i. Unemployment rate, measured by the number of unemployed people
as a percentage of the labour force;
ii. Being or not part of a metropolitan area, measured by a dummy vari-
able taking the value 1 for municipalities included in the metropolitan
areas of Lisbon or Porto and the value 0 if otherwise.
(b) Cultural and social traits of the population:
i. Public expenditure in cultural areas, measured by the amount spent
in events and facilities by the town council on culture and sports
(Euros per capita);
ii. Ageing index, measured by the number of generally economically
inactive people (aged over 64 years old) over the number of young
people (aged less than 15 years old);
iii. Crude birth rate, measured by the number of births during the year
over the average population of the same year, expressed per 1000
inhabitants;
iv. Share of catholic inhabitants, measured by the number of catholic
population as a percentage of the total number of residents;
v. Right or left-wing political majority, measured by a dummy variable
taking the value 1 for municipalities that elected a city mayor from
a right or left-wing political party in the elections of 2005 and 2009
and the value 0 if otherwise;
vi. Abstention rate in the local elections of 2009.
Data sources are the National Statistical Institute of Portugal (INE), Pordata,
Quadros de Pessoal, Associação Nacional dos Municípios Portugueses (ANMP),
Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE) (more details and descriptive statistics in
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Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B). Also in Appendix B, we present the maps with
the distribution of these variables across Portuguese territory (Figures B.1 to B.24).
Using a linear regression model and the ordinary least squared method (OLS),
we will estimate the inﬂuence of the set of variables described above on the local
gender discrimination wage gap. The model writes as:
wage_gapi =Xiβ + εi (4.1)
where wage_gapi represents the gender discrimination wage gap at the county
level and computed as exponential(δˆ) − 1, where δˆ is the estimate of the female
coeﬃcient from model 3.2 as explained in section 3.1. Additionally, for a clearer
interpretation of the coeﬃcients, the discrimination gaps were converted into their
additive inverse, i.e. multiplied by −1, hence enabling an intuitive explanation of a
negative (or positive) estimate as a factor that is associated with lower (or higher)
levels of discrimination, respectively. X is a vector of explanatory variables for each
of the n counties (including a constant term), β represents unknown parameters for
each of the variables contained in X and ε is an unobserved error term (zero mean
and constant variance). X includes the three dimensions of variables presented in
the previous section  characteristics of the demand for labour, characteristics of
the supply of labour and other local determinants.
The model presented in 4.1 is to be applied to the 267 municipalities with sta-
tistically signiﬁcant discrimination gaps at a 10% signiﬁcance level, which excludes
11 counties from the analysis, as discussed in the previous chapter.
4.2 Empirical results
The OLS estimates of Equation 4.1 are reported in Table B.3 in Appendix B. The
results present a R-squared of 0.5398, i.e., the selected explanatory variables account
for 54% of the total variance of the gender wage discrimination gap across the
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Portuguese territory.
Seven independent variables are statistically signiﬁcant: three from the demand
side of labour, one from the supply side and three from the exploratory group of
indicators.
The share of minimum wage earners, from the demand side, is the variable with
a higher impact on the discrimination gap (-0.19). We can say that, ceteris paribus,
an increase of 1 percentage point in the share of minimum wage earners will de-
crease the discrimination gap in 0.19 percentage points. According to authors such
as Robinson (2005) and Blau and Kahn (2016), since women are over-represented at
the bottom of the wage structure, the minimum wage brings up the wage ﬂoor, with
a stronger impact on women's wages. Being so, a higher presence of minimum wage
earners may be increasing the natural wage attributable to women and consequently
resulting in less gender diﬀerences. Secondly, the activity rate of young population,
from the supply side, presents a strong positive relation with the discrimination
gap (+0.18), since 1 additional percentage point in the activity rate of people aged
25 to 34 years old will aggravate the discrimination gap in 0.18 percentage points,
all else unchanged. Since most hiring occurs among younger workers, a higher ac-
tivity rate of the young population can lead to more ﬂexibility of the employers
to discriminate, namely towards women. Several authors, such as Pailhé (2000);
Gorman (2003); Cardoso et al. (2016), recognise gender discrimination practices on
the hiring process, either regarding lower wages or more diﬃcult access to better
occupations, mostly due to expectations of women's career interruptions for mater-
nity matters. Goldin and Rouse (1997) provide a quite interesting study about the
hiring process of orchestra musicians in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States.
A blind audition, where the employer was not able to see whether the candidate
was a man or a woman, would increase a female musician hiring probability in 50%.
The unemployment rate is the third signiﬁcant most impactful variable (-0.16). It
accounts for a decrease of 0.16 percentage points in the discrimination gap for each
21
one additional point, holding all other variables constant, which is consistent with
the theory presented by Huertas et al. (2016). The authors provide empirical evi-
dence for Spain, in the 2000s decade, as high unemployment rates are expected to
negatively impact on the discrimination levels because of an increased pressure over
wages when unemployment is high. The share of workers in the secondary sector
presents a signiﬁcant positive relation with the discrimination gap (+0.11). It repre-
sents an 0.11 percentage points increase in the discrimination gap for each additional
own percentage point, all other factors held constant. The share of workers in the
secondary sector is expected to be related to a higher level of discrimination since
it represents a more traditional form of labour where the role of women is typically
stronger in less complex occupations. A study of the Portuguese labour market in
the 1990s made by Koch and Strotmann (2000) shows that the Textile industry, one
of the most representative subsectors, is an example of feminization of occupations
in the 1990s. Around 70% of Textile workers were women and these women were
the least educated among all activity subsectors  around 90% with primary or
preparatory schooling. The feminization of some industries decades ago can still be
inducing the pay gap in counties with a high presence of those industries. The ab-
stention rate, the only statistically signiﬁcant of the exploratory variables, presents
a relatively high inﬂuence on the discrimination gap (+0.08). This represents ap-
proximately a 0.08 percentage points increase in the discrimination gap for each
additional abstention percentage point, all other factors held constant. It behaves
as expected since the variable is included as a measure of alienation and indiﬀerence
towards local public policy, whether it regards the candidates or policies themselves
(Adams et al., 2006). This indiﬀerence can represent a certain lack of social and
collective consciousness or simply demoralization against current policies and candi-
dates, and can, consequently, be related to discrimination practices. However, this
is an exploratory conclusion and further investigation is required in order to conﬁ-
dently establish this sort of relation. The share of workers in micro establishments
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presents an inverse relation with the dependent variable (-0.06). For 1 additional
percentage point on this factor, the discrimination gap would decrease 0.06 percent-
age points, ceteris paribus. A 2009 report from WINNET8  Women's Resource
Centres, Promoting Innovation in Gender Equality across Europe  performed by
Zimoch and Hozer-Ko¢miel (2010), points to the fact that, in less wealthy countries,
such as Portugal, Italy, Greece and Poland, self-employment is very popular as it
is sometimes the only possible employment for women, resulting in a higher share
of self-employed women in micro-ﬁrms (17,2% in Portugal, 15% in Poland, 16.8%
in Italy and 23% in Greece). This is one possible explanation for the inverse rela-
tion between the share of micro establishments and the discrimination gap at the
county level. Lastly, we conclude that, all other factors being equal, municipalities
that belong to a metropolitan area present a discrimination gap approximately 0.01
percentage point lower, in agreement with the ﬁndings of Hirsch et al. (2013). The
authors, using data fromWestern Germany from 1975 to 2004, provide evidence that
corroborates that more populated and competitive markets present less discrimina-
tion as there is less room for ineﬃciencies. However, the coeﬃcient is relatively small
(-0.01) and consequently of little economic relevance.
4.3 Results validation
To validate the regression results, in this section some robustness analysis are pre-
sented, to conﬁrm assumptions of the linear regression model, such as the inde-
pendence, homoscedasticity (constant variance) and normality of the residuals, the
non-correlation of the explanatory variables, and to investigate the possible presence
of signiﬁcant outliers at the county level.
Regarding residuals analysis, we start by graphically analysing the relationship
between the standardized residuals and the standardized predicted values to validate
their independence and homoscedasticity. By using SPSS Statistics software, we plot
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the former in the X-axis and the latter in the Y -axis (see Figure 4.1). As expected,
the error terms are randomly distributed around the mean (zero) among diﬀerent
values of the prediction. There is no nonlinear pattern present, which grants a ﬁrst
validation to the linear model applied. The model appears to be homoscedastic.
However, using Stata, we reestimate the wage regression at the county level using
robust standard errors, that allows the variance of the errors to vary, i.e., to be
heteroscedastic. We conclude that the results are qualitatively equivalent (Table B.4
in Appendix A), which grants more conﬁdence to the previous results. Additionally,
we analyse the normality of the distribution of the observed residuals. Using again
the SPSS Statistics software, we plot the Normal Probability Plot of the observed
cumulative probability against the expected cumulative probability for a Normal
distribution (see Figure 4.2). We can assume a normal distribution of the residuals
since the observed cumulative probability follows the expected probability plot of
the Normal distribution.
Regarding the assumption of non-correlation between the explanatory variables,
we test for multicollinearity, the ability of linearly predict one variable from the
others, using two diﬀerent methods. Firstly, we calculate the bivariate correlations.
According to Marôco (2011), an absolute value of bivariate correlation higher (lower)
than 0.75 (-0.75) can be problematic and compromise the regression results. We
calculate correlation values using SPSS Statistics and we ﬁnd that only one pair of
variables matches the exact threshold of correlation: ageing index and crude birth
rate. Also, the pairs share of female immigrants - share of catholics and right-wing
political side - left-wing political side present high correlations of -0.74 and -0.73,
respectively, even though not above the speciﬁed threshold (detailed results in Table
B.5). In order to further validate if these variables are problematic to our model,
we will analyse the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF), a more soﬁsticated measure of
multicollinearity. VIF is calculated for each variable i through the expression 1/(1−
Ri
2), where Ri
2 is the determination coeﬃcient of the variable i as the dependent
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Figure 4.1: Standardized residuals distribution across the standardized
regression predictions
variable and the others as the explanatory ones. Using SPSS Statistics software,
we ﬁnd that no explanatory variable surpasses the two most common thresholds
for multicollinearity issues: 5 or 10 (detailed results in Table B.6 in Annex B).
However, the variable share of catholics presents a VIF of 4.94, very close to the
ﬁrst threshold. To assure that no estimation problems arise from this fact, we
reestimated the discrimination regression without this variable and the two other
potentially problematic variables: the ageing index and the right-wing political side,
and prove that the results are qualitatively identical (estimation results in Table B.7
in Appendix B). We then conclude that no issues of multicollinearity are present in
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Figure 4.2: Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
the estimated regression.
Another way of validating the regression results is to study the inﬂuence of
each observation in the estimation of the β vector of coeﬃcients. To do so, we
use the Cook's distance, a measure of inﬂuence measured as a combination of the
standardized residuals and the Leverage. Leverage is a measure of the distance
of one observation's independent variable to the other observations, as an indica-
tor of potential outliers. It takes hii, the i-th diagonal element of the hat matrix
H =X(XTX)−1XT , a transformation of the matrix of the explanatory variables,
deducing the factor 1/n. The leverage can then be calculated for each data point
as hii− 1/n. Values below 0.2 are considered harmless, as stated by Marôco (2011),
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values from 0.2 and 0.5 comprehend a certain risk of the presence of outliers and val-
ues above 0.5 are considered multivariate outliers. The author also mentions other
theories that point to a threshold of 3k/n for k > 6 variables and (n − k) > 12.
According to the ﬁrst set of thresholds, we ﬁnd 8 municipalities (3% of the total
data set) at risk with leverage levels between 0.20 and 0.32  in descending val-
ues of leverage: Castro Verde, São João da Pesqueira, Tarouca, Aljezur, Albufeira,
Penedono, Vila Velha de Ródão and Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo. According to
the second theory, only the ﬁrst 5 counties are considered at risk. To analyse the
impact of these possible 8 outliers, we reestimate the discrimination regression at
the county level excluding these data points. We conclude that the results are qual-
itatively identical with the exception of the variable share of young employers (from
15 to 34 years old) that becomes statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% signiﬁcance level
and presents a negative coeﬃcient of -0.119, which means that, ceteris paribus, an
additional percentage point in the share of young employers means almost less 0.12
percentage points in the discrimination gap. Also, the variable public expenditure
in cultural areas gains statistical signiﬁcance, although with an approximately null
coeﬃcient, hence without impact on the dependent factor. The full estimation re-
sults are present in Table B.8 in Appendix B. From the Leverage values, we can
estimate the Cook's Distance, measured as follows:
DCi =
rihii
(k + 1)(1− hii) (4.2)
where ri are the standardized residuals,hii the diagonal of the hat matrix and k
the number of variables of the model. According to many authors, such as Marôco
(2011), a DC value over 1 means that a speciﬁc data point is overinﬂuencing the
estimation of the coeﬃcients vector. The results point to a minimum of 0 and a
maximum of 0.083, which are comfortable results. The full set of Leverage values
and Cook's distances is presented in Table B.9 in Appendix B.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The ﬁrst aim of this study was to quantify the raw gender pay gap in each munici-
pality of mainland Portugal and to understand how much of the gap is not explained
by worker's, job title and ﬁrm characteristics. We conclude that, one average, Por-
tuguese female workers earn 14% less than their male colleagues. When taking into
account worker, job title and ﬁrm characteristics, the diﬀerence falls to 13%, which
is the value that we can associate to gender wage discrimination. Among counties,
this gap varies from -2% in Caminha to -24% in Sever do Vouga, with the most
discriminatory counties located in the West coast and Central area of the country.
Furthermore, in an exploratory analysis, we try to establish a link between char-
acteristics of the supply and demand of labour and other local determinants with
the discrimination gap. Some interesting and statistically signiﬁcant relations are
found. As expected, factors related to the demand side of the labour market are the
most relevant to explain the discrimination wage gap: a strong negative coeﬃcient
(i.e. associated to lower levels of discrimination) of the share of minimum wage earn-
ers, a negative relation of discrimination with the share of workers in micro-sized
establishments, and a positive relation with the share of secondary activity sector
workers. Regarding the supply side of the labour market, the only variable that has
impact on the discrimination gap is the youth activity rate, a positive impact (i.e.
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associated to higher levels of discrimination) that can be related to discrimination
against women on hiring practices, more present among youngsters. Regarding the
state of the local labour market, a high unemployment rate is associated with lower
levels of discrimination and, ﬁnally, regions with a higher abstention rate are found
to discriminate more, although it is diﬃcult to state a causal relationship between
the two indicators.
This study has some limitations, among them the very low frequency of data
collection at the county level. We performed a cross-sectional data analysis for the
year of 2012. If more information was collected and provided, a richer analysis could
be made using for instance panel data. This would allow to account for regional ﬁxed
eﬀects.
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discrimination
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Table A.1: Wage regression at the worker level: variables description
DimensionVariable Description
Worker Female Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for female workers
and 0 otherwise
Worker Age Workers' age (in years) and its square
Worker Foreigner Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for foreigners and
0 otherwise
Worker Education 3 dummy variables for 4 levels of education: primary
school (ommited category), 6 to 9 years of schooling, high
school and college education
Job title Qualiﬁcation 7 dummy variables for 8 qualiﬁcation levels, according to
the National Qualiﬁcation Framework (1-digit level)
Job title Tenure Worker's tenure in the current establishment in years,
also included in the quadratic form to capture non-linear
correlations
Job title Occupation 8 dummy variables for 9 occupations, according to the
Portuguese Classiﬁcation of Occupations (1-digit level)
Job title Type of
contract
2 dummy variables, the ﬁrst taking the value 1 for part-
time jobs and 0 otherwise, the other taking the value 1
for permanent employment and 0 otherwise
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the number of employees of the
worker's establishment
Firm Industry 19 dummy variables for 20 economic activities, according
to the Statistical Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities (1-
digit level)
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Municipality N Raw gap Sig. Disc. gap Sig.
Abrantes 6405 -0.202 0.000 -0.107 0.000
Águeda 13531 -0.211 0.000 -0.182 0.000
Aguiar da Beira 894 -0.102 0.000 -0.096 0.000
Alandroal 635 -0.094 0.000 -0.139 0.000
Albergaria-a-Velha 6248 -0.173 0.000 -0.175 0.000
Albufeira 14961 -0.117 0.000 -0.079 0.000
Alcácer do Sal 1839 -0.159 0.000 -0.099 0.000
Alcanena 4496 -0.146 0.000 -0.185 0.000
Alcobaça 12399 -0.218 0.000 -0.195 0.000
Alcochete 3871 -0.181 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Alcoutim 285 -0.157 0.001 -0.099 0.013
Alenquer 10105 -0.164 0.000 -0.167 0.000
Alfandega da Fé 453 0.059 0.073 -0.005 0.858
Alijó 1468 -0.174 0.000 -0.11 0.000
Aljezur 649 -0.16 0.000 -0.097 0.000
Aljustrel 1783 -0.204 0.000 -0.148 0.000
Almada 21445 -0.113 0.000 -0.073 0.000
Almeida 901 -0.131 0.000 -0.077 0.000
Almeirim 3652 -0.158 0.000 -0.112 0.000
Almodôvar 791 -0.145 0.000 -0.105 0.000
Alpiarça 1080 -0.168 0.000 -0.124 0.000
Alter do Chão 440 -0.203 0.000 -0.059 0.089
Alvaiázere 1198 -0.161 0.000 -0.093 0.000
Alvito 267 -0.07 0.183 -0.092 0.011
Amadora 34730 -0.219 0.000 -0.112 0.000
Amarante 9258 -0.095 0.000 -0.152 0.000
Amares 2496 -0.18 0.000 -0.119 0.000
Anadia 6056 -0.137 0.000 -0.153 0.000
Ansião 2244 -0.141 0.000 -0.121 0.000
Arcos de Valdevez 3698 -0.04 0.001 -0.107 0.000
Arganil 2113 -0.228 0.000 -0.19 0.000
Armamar 847 -0.046 0.053 -0.048 0.015
Arouca 4211 -0.086 0.000 -0.111 0.000
Arraiolos 1132 -0.192 0.000 -0.182 0.000
Arronches 437 -0.046 0.252 -0.043 0.359
Arruda dos Vinhos 2642 -0.072 0.000 -0.146 0.000
Aveiro 26660 -0.209 0.000 -0.144 0.000
Avis 810 -0.219 0.000 -0.159 0.000
Azambuja 5856 -0.181 0.000 -0.153 0.000
Baião 2229 -0.051 0.000 -0.134 0.000
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Barcelos 30896 -0.156 0.000 -0.147 0.000
Barrancos 214 0.026 0.607 -0.085 0.028
Barreiro 10036 -0.213 0.000 -0.11 0.000
Batalha 4982 -0.161 0.000 -0.226 0.000
Beja 7029 -0.106 0.000 -0.084 0.000
Belmonte 1522 -0.217 0.000 -0.14 0.000
Benavente 6930 -0.184 0.000 -0.17 0.000
Bombarral 1881 -0.135 0.000 -0.113 0.000
Borba 1048 -0.131 0.000 -0.143 0.000
Boticas 761 -0.072 0.003 -0.11 0.000
Braga 46721 -0.114 0.000 -0.11 0.000
Bragança 5425 -0.094 0.000 -0.068 0.000
Cabeceiras de Basto 2237 -0.05 0.003 -0.081 0.000
Cadaval 2030 -0.168 0.000 -0.158 0.000
Caldas da Rainha 10194 -0.139 0.000 -0.102 0.000
Caminha 2027 -0.032 0.12 -0.024 0.086
Campo Maior 2068 -0.164 0.000 -0.184 0.000
Cantanhede 7339 -0.208 0.000 -0.151 0.000
Carrazeda de Ansiães 557 -0.076 0.023 -0.09 0.000
Carregal do Sal 1577 -0.129 0.000 -0.166 0.000
Cartaxo 3329 -0.16 0.000 -0.128 0.000
Cascais 36405 -0.04 0.000 -0.092 0.000
Castanheira de Pera 416 0.048 0.333 -0.123 0.000
Castelo Branco 10955 -0.129 0.000 -0.126 0.000
Castelo de Paiva 2683 -0.136 0.000 -0.114 0.000
Castelo de Vide 496 -0.099 0.002 -0.096 0.000
Castro Daire 1876 -0.1 0.000 -0.107 0.000
Castro Marim 929 -0.115 0.000 -0.112 0.000
Castro Verde 2784 -0.462 0.000 -0.13 0.000
Celorico da Beira 1055 -0.099 0.000 -0.088 0.000
Celorico de Basto 2008 -0.143 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Chamusca 1690 -0.111 0.000 -0.093 0.000
Chaves 5665 -0.079 0.000 -0.111 0.000
Cinfães 1817 -0.125 0.000 -0.064 0.000
Coimbra 35302 -0.172 0.000 -0.118 0.000
Condeixa-a-Nova 2113 -0.19 0.000 -0.159 0.000
Constância 907 -0.3 0.000 -0.203 0.000
Coruche 3067 -0.133 0.000 -0.114 0.000
Covilhã 9279 -0.11 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Crato 459 -0.042 0.188 -0.06 0.017
Cuba 361 -0.072 0.057 -0.094 0.003
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Elvas 3187 -0.123 0.000 -0.115 0.000
Entroncamento 3418 -0.333 0.000 -0.105 0.000
Espinho 4676 -0.127 0.000 -0.092 0.000
Esposende 7126 -0.105 0.000 -0.164 0.000
Estarreja 5349 -0.194 0.000 -0.158 0.000
Estremoz 2493 -0.148 0.000 -0.121 0.000
Évora 13599 -0.148 0.000 -0.113 0.000
Fafe 9897 -0.101 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Faro 17569 -0.135 0.000 -0.092 0.000
Feira 30615 -0.152 0.000 -0.152 0.000
Felgueiras 20347 -0.132 0.000 -0.115 0.000
Ferreira do Alentejo 1729 -0.074 0.000 -0.079 0.000
Ferreira do Zêzere 1543 -0.148 0.000 -0.183 0.000
Figueira da Foz 13112 -0.284 0.000 -0.227 0.000
Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo 814 0.052 0.144 -0.077 0.000
Figueiró dos Vinhos 692 -0.076 0.013 -0.045 0.114
Fornos de Algodres 601 -0.081 0.016 -0.051 0.094
Freixo de Espada à Cinta 480 -0.112 0.000 -0.062 0.015
Fronteira 429 -0.176 0.000 -0.139 0.000
Fundão 4865 -0.101 0.000 -0.132 0.000
Gavião 368 -0.237 0.000 -0.127 0.000
Góis 537 -0.07 0.02 -0.127 0.000
Golegã 823 -0.147 0.000 -0.095 0.000
Gondomar 19286 -0.153 0.000 -0.123 0.000
Gouveia 1703 -0.071 0.000 -0.089 0.000
Grandola 1991 -0.242 0.000 -0.099 0.000
Guarda 8614 -0.115 0.000 -0.133 0.000
Guimarães 44869 -0.111 0.000 -0.099 0.000
Idanha-a-Nova 1200 -0.09 0.000 -0.113 0.000
Ílhavo 6664 -0.253 0.000 -0.198 0.000
Lagoa 5237 -0.102 0.000 -0.086 0.000
Lagos 6284 -0.094 0.000 -0.076 0.000
Lamego 3770 -0.071 0.000 -0.098 0.000
Leiria 35127 -0.209 0.000 -0.186 0.000
Lisboa 308636 -0.162 0.000 -0.077 0.000
Loulé 19266 -0.118 0.000 -0.091 0.000
Loures 45330 -0.194 0.000 -0.146 0.000
Lourinhã 3733 -0.137 0.000 -0.15 0.000
Lousã 2621 -0.142 0.000 -0.139 0.000
Lousada 10668 -0.144 0.000 -0.13 0.000
Mação 1064 -0.15 0.000 -0.108 0.000
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Macedo de Cavaleiros 1717 -0.041 0.036 -0.069 0.000
Mafra 16561 -0.09 0.000 -0.12 0.000
Maia 45450 -0.239 0.000 -0.15 0.000
Mangualde 5044 -0.299 0.000 -0.233 0.000
Manteigas 441 -0.026 0.447 -0.063 0.018
Marco de Canaveses 10706 -0.184 0.000 -0.131 0.000
Marinha Grande 10301 -0.318 0.000 -0.215 0.000
Marvão 379 -0.173 0.000 -0.062 0.082
Matosinhos 52211 -0.243 0.000 -0.136 0.000
Mealhada 4004 -0.206 0.000 -0.139 0.000
Meda 603 -0.129 0.000 -0.071 0.016
Melgaço 888 -0.147 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Mértola 895 0.045 0.059 -0.03 0.108
Mesão Frio 373 -0.112 0.004 -0.077 0.015
Mira 1839 -0.177 0.000 -0.133 0.000
Miranda do Corvo 1245 -0.088 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Miranda do Douro 925 -0.137 0.000 -0.047 0.007
Mirandela 3345 -0.109 0.000 -0.099 0.000
Mogadouro 964 -0.104 0.000 -0.076 0.000
Moimenta da Beira 1312 -0.104 0.000 -0.094 0.000
Moita 5320 -0.125 0.000 -0.115 0.000
Monção 2782 -0.117 0.000 -0.137 0.000
Monchique 764 -0.047 0.068 -0.03 0.158
Mondim de Basto 796 0.011 0.599 -0.043 0.033
Monforte 447 -0.103 0.005 -0.101 0.000
Montalegre 869 -0.072 0.01 -0.054 0.014
Montemor-o-Novo 3089 -0.131 0.000 -0.156 0.000
Montemor-o-Velho 2874 -0.178 0.000 -0.147 0.000
Montijo 9042 -0.149 0.000 -0.098 0.000
Mora 939 -0.123 0.000 -0.093 0.000
Mortágua 1859 -0.153 0.000 -0.179 0.000
Moura 2125 -0.037 0.04 -0.102 0.000
Mourão 254 -0.015 0.754 -0.044 0.211
Murça 556 -0.051 0.132 -0.073 0.002
Murtosa 1381 -0.014 0.64 -0.148 0.000
Nazaré 2335 -0.138 0.000 -0.091 0.000
Nelas 2403 -0.215 0.000 -0.186 0.000
Nisa 841 -0.131 0.000 -0.094 0.000
óbidos 2621 -0.149 0.000 -0.108 0.000
Odemira 5018 -0.035 0.002 -0.084 0.000
Odivelas 16088 -0.094 0.000 -0.076 0.000
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Oeiras 72864 -0.233 0.000 -0.108 0.000
Oleiros 662 -0.103 0.000 -0.092 0.000
Olhão 5432 -0.169 0.000 -0.139 0.000
Oliveira de Azeméis 20371 -0.252 0.000 -0.203 0.000
Oliveira de Frades 3922 -0.222 0.000 -0.219 0.000
Oliveira do Bairro 5787 -0.184 0.000 -0.174 0.000
Oliveira do Hospital 4314 -0.175 0.000 -0.168 0.000
Ourém 12028 -0.177 0.000 -0.129 0.000
Ourique 747 0.017 0.46 -0.035 0.073
Ovar 13635 -0.175 0.000 -0.166 0.000
Paços de Ferreira 15929 -0.071 0.000 -0.07 0.000
Palmela 18790 -0.232 0.000 -0.159 0.000
Pampilhosa da Serra 544 -0.075 0.008 -0.127 0.000
Paredes 15744 -0.044 0.000 -0.097 0.000
Paredes de Coura 919 -0.109 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Pedrogão Grande 486 -0.08 0.017 -0.087 0.002
Penacova 1596 -0.134 0.000 -0.099 0.000
Penaﬁel 15513 -0.153 0.000 -0.147 0.000
Penalva do Castelo 940 -0.15 0.000 -0.048 0.043
Penamacor 449 -0.083 0.016 -0.112 0.000
Penedono 364 -0.095 0.047 -0.141 0.000
Penela 1391 -0.258 0.000 -0.167 0.000
Peniche 4584 -0.193 0.000 -0.183 0.000
Peso da Régua 2638 -0.134 0.000 -0.085 0.000
Pinhel 1150 -0.059 0.005 -0.053 0.011
Pombal 12421 -0.184 0.000 -0.214 0.000
Ponte da Barca 1434 -0.051 0.014 -0.087 0.000
Ponte de Lima 7254 -0.104 0.000 -0.126 0.000
Ponte de Sôr 2424 -0.132 0.000 -0.082 0.000
Portalegre 4384 -0.195 0.000 -0.115 0.000
Portel 639 -0.1 0.001 -0.113 0.000
Portimão 13015 -0.078 0.000 -0.091 0.000
Porto 97178 -0.137 0.000 -0.096 0.000
Porto de Mós 4987 -0.178 0.000 -0.18 0.000
Póvoa de Lanhoso 3858 -0.082 0.000 -0.111 0.000
Póvoa de Varzim 12458 -0.149 0.000 -0.132 0.000
Proença-a-Nova 1042 -0.053 0.031 -0.078 0.000
Redondo 825 -0.106 0.000 -0.113 0.000
Reguengos de Monsaraz 1712 -0.089 0.000 -0.099 0.000
Resende 766 0.012 0.699 -0.074 0.002
Ribeira de Pena 696 -0.066 0.023 -0.056 0.025
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Rio Maior 4637 -0.18 0.000 -0.2 0.000
Sabrosa 1000 -0.193 0.000 -0.086 0.000
Sabugal 1666 -0.015 0.428 -0.096 0.000
Salvaterra de Magos 3087 -0.17 0.000 -0.145 0.000
Santa Comba Dão 1598 -0.127 0.000 -0.111 0.000
Santa Marta de Penaguião 524 0.033 0.317 -0.075 0.001
Santarém 13185 -0.169 0.000 -0.161 0.000
Santiago do Cacém 4462 -0.112 0.000 -0.124 0.000
Santo Tirso 15798 -0.172 0.000 -0.173 0.000
São Brás de Alportel 1469 -0.037 0.088 -0.085 0.000
São João da Madeira 11118 -0.163 0.000 -0.13 0.000
São João da Pesqueira 988 -0.103 0.000 -0.106 0.000
São Pedro do Sul 2268 -0.115 0.000 -0.118 0.000
Sardoal 432 -0.071 0.028 -0.025 0.436
Sátão 1337 -0.084 0.000 -0.097 0.000
Seia 4127 -0.123 0.000 -0.091 0.000
Seixal 17125 -0.161 0.000 -0.12 0.000
Sernancelhe 711 -0.053 0.045 -0.083 0.001
Serpa 1673 -0.063 0.000 -0.103 0.000
Sertã 2694 -0.133 0.000 -0.134 0.000
Sesimbra 5076 -0.148 0.000 -0.066 0.000
Setúbal 23022 -0.23 0.000 -0.152 0.000
Sever do Vouga 2347 -0.222 0.000 -0.244 0.000
Silves 4855 -0.104 0.000 -0.105 0.000
Sines 5688 -0.429 0.000 -0.169 0.000
Sintra 55108 -0.142 0.000 -0.116 0.000
Sobral de Monte Agraço 1485 -0.117 0.000 -0.132 0.000
Soure 1972 -0.161 0.000 -0.133 0.000
Sousel 847 -0.134 0.000 -0.102 0.000
Tábua 2480 -0.133 0.000 -0.1 0.000
Tabuaço 543 -0.092 0.006 -0.071 0.006
Tarouca 1050 -0.092 0.000 -0.086 0.000
Tavira 4238 -0.095 0.000 -0.05 0.000
Terras de Bouro 865 -0.199 0.000 -0.006 0.759
Tomar 5522 -0.156 0.000 -0.119 0.000
Tondela 5241 -0.105 0.000 -0.119 0.000
Torre de Moncorvo 1504 -0.217 0.000 -0.03 0.14
Torres Novas 7670 -0.136 0.000 -0.139 0.000
Torres Vedras 16063 -0.131 0.000 -0.156 0.000
Trancoso 1491 -0.126 0.000 -0.117 0.000
Trofa 11284 -0.093 0.000 -0.103 0.000
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Table A.3: Wage regressions at the worker level: Estimates of the
raw gender wage gap and the gender wage discrimination gap by
county, Portugal 2012 (includes the number of workers per county
and the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient delta)
Vagos 3664 -0.127 0.000 -0.108 0.000
Vale de Cambra 6312 -0.245 0.000 -0.163 0.000
Valença 4163 -0.218 0.000 -0.157 0.000
Valongo 13228 -0.167 0.000 -0.134 0.000
Valpaços 1419 -0.074 0.000 -0.063 0.001
Vendas Novas 2304 -0.169 0.000 -0.191 0.000
Viana do Alentejo 643 -0.127 0.000 -0.147 0.000
Viana do Castelo 19431 -0.178 0.000 -0.179 0.000
Vidigueira 764 -0.124 0.000 -0.134 0.000
Vieira do Minho 1333 -0.171 0.000 -0.025 0.274
Vila de Rei 524 -0.115 0.000 -0.082 0.000
Vila do Bispo 1092 -0.052 0.036 -0.022 0.279
Vila do Conde 18285 -0.184 0.000 -0.163 0.000
Vila Flor 828 -0.07 0.004 -0.062 0.001
Vila Franca de Xira 25364 -0.194 0.000 -0.133 0.000
Vila Nova da Barquinha 539 -0.231 0.000 -0.119 0.000
Vila Nova de Cerveira 2860 -0.177 0.000 -0.147 0.000
Vila Nova de Famalicão 37510 -0.212 0.000 -0.202 0.000
Vila Nova de Foz Côa 894 -0.134 0.000 -0.054 0.01
Vila Nova de Gaia 54452 -0.113 0.000 -0.125 0.000
Vila Nova de Paiva 446 0.012 0.73 -0.062 0.037
Vila Nova de Poiares 1521 -0.161 0.000 -0.172 0.000
Vila Pouca de Aguiar 1427 -0.083 0.000 -0.074 0.000
Vila Real 8808 -0.066 0.000 -0.076 0.000
Vila Real de Santo António 3396 -0.157 0.000 -0.074 0.000
Vila Velha de Ródão 656 -0.413 0.000 -0.176 0.000
Vila Verde 7345 -0.1 0.000 -0.126 0.000
Vila Viçosa 1503 -0.228 0.000 -0.127 0.000
Vimioso 426 -0.086 0.013 -0.106 0.000
Vinhais 603 -0.061 0.039 -0.103 0.000
Viseu 22154 -0.093 0.000 -0.111 0.000
Vizela 6247 -0.146 0.000 -0.109 0.000
Vouzela 1751 -0.15 0.000 -0.146 0.000
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Appendix B
Local determinants of the wage
discrimination gap
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Figure B.1: Share of minimum wage
earners, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.2: Share of workers in the
primary sector, Portugal, 2011
49
Figure B.3: Share of workers in the
secondary sector, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.4: Share of workers in the
terciary sector, Portugal, 2011
50
Figure B.5: Share of workers in micro-
sized establishments, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.6: Share of workers in small-
sized establishments, Portugal, 2011
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Figure B.7: Share of workers in
medium-sized establishments, Portu-
gal, 2011
Figure B.8: Share of workers in large
establishments, Portugal, 2011
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Figure B.9: Share of female employ-
ers, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.10: Share of young employ-
ers (15 to 34 years old), Portugal,
2011
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Figure B.11: Youth activity rate (15
to 24 years old), Portugal, 2011
Figure B.12: Youth activity rate (25
to 34 years old), Portugal, 2011
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Figure B.13: Share of female workers,
Portugal, 2011
Figure B.14: Share of workers holding
a college degree, Portugal, 2011
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Figure B.15: Share of female immi-
grants, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.16: Total unemployment
rate, Portugal, 2011
56
Figure B.17: Metropolitan areas of
Porto and Lisbon, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.18: Public expenditure in
cultural areas e per capita), Portu-
gal, 2011
57
Figure B.19: Ageing Index, Portugal,
2011
Figure B.20: Crude birth rate per
1000 inhabitants, Portugal, 2011
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Figure B.21: Share of catholic popu-
lation, Portugal, 2011
Figure B.22: Counties with a right-
wing political majority in the elec-
tions of 2005 and 2009, Portugal
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Figure B.23: Counties with a left-
wing political majority in the elec-
tions of 2005 and 2009, Portugal
Figure B.24: Abstention rate in
county elections, Portugal, 2009
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Table B.6: Wage discrimination regression at the county level: Variance Inﬂation
Factor
Explanatory variables VIF
Share of minimum wage earners 2.457
Share of workers of the primary sector 1.901
Share of workers of the secondary sector 3.73
Share of workers of micro establishments 3.988
Share of workers of small establishments 1.985
Share of workers of medium-sized establishments 3.244
Share of female employers 1.374
Share of young employers: (15-34 years old) 1.282
Activity rate 15-24 years old 2.345
Activity rate 25-34 years old 2.242
Female workers share of employment 1.578
Share of workers holding a college degree 2.097
Share of female immigrants 3.029
Unemployment rate 1.417
Part of a metropolitan area (dummy) 1.659
Public expenditure in cultural areas e per capita) 1.451
Ageing index 3.341
Crude birth rate per 1000 inhabitants 3.922
Share of catholics 4.936
Right-wing political majority in the last 2 elections 2.384
Left-wing political majority in the last 2 elections 2.587
Abstention rate in 2009 1.94
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Table B.9: Wage regression at the worker level: Leverage and
Cook's Distance (sorted in descending order of Leverage)
Municipality Leverage Cook's D.
Castro Verde 0.322 0.015
São João da Pesqueira 0.264 0.004
Tarouca 0.262 0.035
Aljezur 0.261 0.083
Albufeira 0.257 0.007
Penedono 0.220 0.050
Vila Velha de Ródão 0.206 0.002
Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo 0.202 0.002
Grandola 0.200 0.007
Fronteira 0.198 0.028
Sines 0.187 0.000
Gavião 0.184 0.012
Monforte 0.184 0.003
Vila Nova de Paiva 0.182 0.001
Cinfães 0.179 0.039
Vila de Rei 0.173 0.015
Góis 0.167 0.020
Pampilhosa da Serra 0.167 0.016
Alcoutim 0.166 0.001
Carrazeda de Ansiães 0.159 0.029
Freixo de Espada à Cinta 0.155 0.004
Resende 0.155 0.002
Oleiros 0.154 0.012
Alandroal 0.152 0.001
Alvito 0.149 0.002
Oeiras 0.146 0.001
Alter do Chão 0.145 0.025
Aljustrel 0.141 0.009
Lisboa 0.141 0.007
Vimioso 0.141 0.004
Lagos 0.141 0.003
Valença 0.136 0.011
Porto 0.131 0.001
Penela 0.128 0.000
Oliveira de Frades 0.126 0.007
Idanha-a-Nova 0.125 0.009
Mesão Frio 0.125 0.006
Ourique 0.124 0.027
Odemira 0.124 0.001
Boticas 0.122 0.008
Redondo 0.122 0.002
Mondim de Basto 0.121 0.006
Vale de Cambra 0.121 0.002
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Table B.9: Wage regression at the worker level: Leverage and
Cook's Distance (sorted in descending order of Leverage)
Alpiarça 0.120 0.004
Mangualde 0.119 0.047
Ferreira do Alentejo 0.119 0.013
Arouca 0.118 0.001
Amadora 0.117 0.000
Cuba 0.115 0.002
Serpa 0.115 0.000
Murtosa 0.114 0.006
Avis 0.113 0.016
Penamacor 0.112 0.007
Lagoa 0.112 0.001
Belmonte 0.112 0.000
Vidigueira 0.110 0.000
Mafra 0.110 0.000
Vinhais 0.109 0.023
Sabrosa 0.109 0.008
Azambuja 0.109 0.004
Campo Maior 0.106 0.002
Vouzela 0.105 0.007
Castanheira de Pera 0.105 0.000
Melgaço 0.105 0.000
Tabuaço 0.103 0.004
Paços de Ferreira 0.102 0.022
São Brás de Alportel 0.101 0.006
Constância 0.097 0.003
Condeixa-a-Nova 0.097 0.000
Tábua 0.096 0.007
Moita 0.096 0.001
Crato 0.095 0.005
Arruda dos Vinhos 0.095 0.001
Vila Flor 0.094 0.008
Mação 0.094 0.004
Loulé 0.094 0.002
Felgueiras 0.093 0.031
Pedrogão Grande 0.093 0.005
Manteigas 0.092 0.003
Vila Nova de Poiares 0.091 0.002
Ribeira de Pena 0.090 0.019
São João da Madeira 0.090 0.008
Elvas 0.090 0.001
Santo Tirso 0.089 0.017
Celorico da Beira 0.089 0.009
Paredes de Coura 0.089 0.006
Montijo 0.089 0.006
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Table B.9: Wage regression at the worker level: Leverage and
Cook's Distance (sorted in descending order of Leverage)
Vila Nova de Cerveira 0.089 0.005
Espinho 0.089 0.001
Palmela 0.089 0.001
Lousada 0.088 0.001
Trofa 0.086 0.003
Cascais 0.085 0.001
Moimenta da Beira 0.084 0.001
Portimão 0.084 0.001
Vizela 0.083 0.008
Baião 0.083 0.004
Oliveira de Azeméis 0.083 0.002
Paredes 0.082 0.001
Portel 0.081 0.002
Castelo de Paiva 0.081 0.001
Fafe 0.081 0.000
Santa Marta de Penaguião 0.080 0.000
Cabeceiras de Basto 0.080 0.000
Murça 0.079 0.004
Vila Nova de Foz Côa 0.078 0.008
Marvão 0.078 0.002
Vila Viçosa 0.077 0.000
Vila Real de Santo António 0.077 0.000
Coimbra 0.077 0.000
Entroncamento 0.076 0.008
Penacova 0.075 0.003
Mogadouro 0.075 0.002
Castelo de Vide 0.075 0.000
Sousel 0.075 0.000
Olhão 0.074 0.007
Ponte de Sôr 0.074 0.004
Gondomar 0.074 0.002
Moura 0.074 0.000
Miranda do Douro 0.073 0.008
Odivelas 0.073 0.004
Alvaiázere 0.073 0.003
Fornos de Algodres 0.073 0.002
Castro Marim 0.072 0.006
Monção 0.072 0.002
Almeida 0.072 0.000
Sesimbra 0.071 0.012
Tavira 0.071 0.005
Viana do Alentejo 0.071 0.005
Mira 0.071 0.004
Alcochete 0.071 0.002
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Table B.9: Wage regression at the worker level: Leverage and
Cook's Distance (sorted in descending order of Leverage)
Celorico de Basto 0.071 0.002
Ílhavo 0.070 0.001
Sintra 0.070 0.000
Ponte da Barca 0.069 0.001
Penalva do Castelo 0.068 0.022
Meda 0.068 0.002
Matosinhos 0.067 0.004
Castro Daire 0.067 0.000
Marco de Canaveses 0.067 0.000
Barrancos 0.067 0.000
óbidos 0.066 0.001
Aguiar da Beira 0.066 0.000
Mora 0.065 0.007
Proença-a-Nova 0.065 0.003
Silves 0.065 0.002
Faro 0.065 0.001
Feira 0.065 0.000
Estarreja 0.065 0.000
Beja 0.064 0.003
Guarda 0.063 0.002
Sobral de Monte Agraço 0.063 0.000
Sabugal 0.062 0.000
Figueira da Foz 0.061 0.018
Arcos de Valdevez 0.061 0.004
Nisa 0.061 0.000
Caminha 0.060 0.018
Armamar 0.060 0.008
Chamusca 0.060 0.008
Borba 0.060 0.001
Valpaços 0.060 0.000
Albergaria-a-Velha 0.060 0.000
Macedo de Cavaleiros 0.060 0.000
Loures 0.059 0.003
Montalegre 0.059 0.001
Ovar 0.059 0.000
Barcelos 0.059 0.000
Barreiro 0.059 0.000
Nelas 0.058 0.003
Almada 0.058 0.003
Vila Nova de Gaia 0.058 0.000
Maia 0.057 0.002
Portalegre 0.057 0.000
Mortágua 0.056 0.006
Golegã 0.056 0.001
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Table B.9: Wage regression at the worker level: Leverage and
Cook's Distance (sorted in descending order of Leverage)
Amares 0.056 0.000
Batalha 0.055 0.008
Vendas Novas 0.055 0.005
Nazaré 0.055 0.003
Almodôvar 0.055 0.001
Carregal do Sal 0.055 0.001
Penaﬁel 0.055 0.001
Vila Nova da Barquinha 0.055 0.001
Santiago do Cacém 0.055 0.000
Ourém 0.055 0.000
Mealhada 0.055 0.000
Oliveira do Bairro 0.055 0.000
Arraiolos 0.054 0.005
Ferreira do Zêzere 0.054 0.004
Oliveira do Hospital 0.054 0.003
Póvoa de Varzim 0.054 0.003
Valongo 0.054 0.002
Vila Real 0.054 0.002
Aveiro 0.054 0.000
Vila do Conde 0.052 0.004
Vila Franca de Xira 0.052 0.000
Alcácer do Sal 0.051 0.001
Alijó 0.051 0.000
Montemor-o-Velho 0.051 0.000
Tondela 0.050 0.006
Setúbal 0.050 0.003
Marinha Grande 0.050 0.001
Benavente 0.050 0.001
Vila Pouca de Aguiar 0.049 0.002
Alenquer 0.049 0.001
Águeda 0.049 0.000
Sever do Vouga 0.048 0.019
Arganil 0.048 0.016
Pinhel 0.048 0.006
Seixal 0.048 0.000
Pombal 0.047 0.008
Bragança 0.047 0.003
Braga 0.047 0.002
Porto de Mós 0.047 0.001
Miranda do Corvo 0.047 0.000
Évora 0.045 0.002
Salvaterra de Magos 0.045 0.002
Soure 0.045 0.001
Tomar 0.045 0.000
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Cook's Distance (sorted in descending order of Leverage)
Sernancelhe 0.045 0.000
Abrantes 0.044 0.002
Seia 0.044 0.002
Gouveia 0.044 0.000
Trancoso 0.043 0.001
Leiria 0.042 0.002
Reguengos de Monsaraz 0.042 0.001
Vila Nova de Famalicão 0.041 0.006
Covilhã 0.041 0.001
Anadia 0.041 0.001
Caldas da Rainha 0.041 0.001
São Pedro do Sul 0.041 0.001
Bombarral 0.041 0.000
Almeirim 0.040 0.001
Viseu 0.040 0.001
Estremoz 0.040 0.000
Torres Novas 0.040 0.000
Guimarães 0.039 0.006
Alcanena 0.039 0.001
Sertã 0.039 0.001
Coruche 0.039 0.001
Sátão 0.039 0.000
Castelo Branco 0.039 0.000
Peniche 0.038 0.008
Amarante 0.038 0.001
Póvoa de Lanhoso 0.038 0.000
Viana do Castelo 0.037 0.002
Santarém 0.037 0.001
Esposende 0.037 0.001
Lamego 0.037 0.000
Cartaxo 0.037 0.000
Mirandela 0.036 0.000
Chaves 0.035 0.003
Vila Verde 0.035 0.000
Santa Comba Dão 0.035 0.000
Alcobaça 0.034 0.005
Rio Maior 0.034 0.005
Montemor-o-Novo 0.034 0.001
Vagos 0.032 0.003
Lourinhã 0.032 0.002
Ansião 0.032 0.000
Ponte de Lima 0.031 0.000
Cadaval 0.030 0.002
Peso da Régua 0.030 0.000
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Torres Vedras 0.029 0.001
Lousã 0.029 0.000
Fundão 0.028 0.001
Cantanhede 0.028 0.000
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